A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoners' Dilemma by Jeffrey Ely
A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's
Dilemma 
Jerey C. Elyy Juuso V¨ alim¨ akiz
December 23, 1999
Abstract
We prove the folk theorem for the Prisoner's dilemma using strate-
gies that are robust to private monitoring. From this follows a limit
folk theorem: when players are patient and monitoring is suciently
accurate, (but private and possibly independent) any feasible individ-
ually rational payo can be obtained in sequential equilibrium. The
strategies used can be implemented by nite (randomizing) automata.
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1The folk theorem for discounted repeated games states that every payo
vector that is feasible and individually rational is an equilibrium payo when
players are suciently patient. A proof of the folk theorem rst appeared
in Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) for subgame-perfect equilibria of repeated
games with perfect monitoring. Perfect monitoring means that the history
of chosen actions is always common knowledge among the players. In many
important economic applications, players monitor one another imperfectly:
each observes a noisy signal of the actions chosen by others. Thus, start-
ing with the early papers by Radner (1985) and Green and Porter (1984),
attention turned to repeated games with imperfect monitoring. The early
applications were to situations in which monitoring, while imperfect, was
public: the random payo-relevant outcome in each stage was assumed com-
mon knowledge among the players. Exploiting the structure of public mon-
itoring, dynamic programming techniques can be used to characterize the
set of perfect public equilibrium payos as in Abreu, Pearce, and Stachetti
(1986) and Abreu, Pearce, and Stachetti (1990). This approach to imperfect
monitoring culminated in the folk theorem of Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin
(1994) which identied conditions on the public monitoring technology which
ensured that all feasible and individually rational payos could be supported
in equilibrium.
In repeated games with monitoring by privately observed signals, these
techniques do not apply and whether the folk theorem extends is still an open
question. Indeed, for some games, whether there are any sequential equilibria
dierent from repetition of stage-game Nash proles is unresolved.1 Numer-
ous negative results emphasize the diculties invovled. Matsushima (1991)
considers repeated play of stage games with a unique Nash equilibrium and
monitoring by conditionally independent private signals. Conditional inde-
pendence means that for each action prole, the players' private signals are
distributed independently of one another. Each individual's private signal
may be arbitrarily informative about the realized action prole, but condi-
tional on that action prole, each player's signal is uninformative about the
signals observed by other players. Matsushima shows that if there is any
pure-strategy equilibrium dierent from repetition of the stage game Nash
prole, it must involve conditioning on payo-irrelevant history. Specically,
there must be a player i and a pair of histories for i which give rise to identical
1For a particularly problematic example, see the discussion in Mailath and Morris
(1998) of the \convention game" originally studied by Shin and Williamson (1991)
2beliefs over the opponents' continuation strategies but which nevertheless in-
duce distinct continuation play by i. In particular, this implies that equilibria
cannot be \strict."2
Many of the strategies used to prove folk theorems in environments with
public monitoring fail to be even approximate equilibria when monitoring is
at all imperfect but conditionally independent. For example, consider the
strategies used by Fudenberg and Maskin (1991) to prove the folk theorem
under perfect monitoring. These strategies begin in a cooperative phase in
which players play a deterministic sequence of pure action proles until some
player deviates from that sequence. Such a deviation triggers a punishment
in which the deviating player is minmaxed. Continuation strategies are con-
structed so that the non-deviating players have an incentive to carry out
the punishment and return to the cooperative phase. When the discount
factor is close enough to one, each player has a strict incentive to follow his
equilibrium strategy after every history.
It is this strictness property that implies that even the slightest conditi-
nally independent private monitoring imperfections destroy the equilibrium.
To see this, consider a player i who has detected a deviation by player j in
stage 1. Since i knows that j is following his equilibrium strategy, i knows
that j has not deviated and in fact that no player has deviated. Since the
equilibrium was constructed so that i has a strict incentive to cooperate after
histories in which no player has deviated, i will not punish but will instead
continue to cooperate. But this unwillingness to punish signals of bad be-
havior eliminates the necessary incentives to cooperate in the rst place.
This naturally raises the question of what equilibria of games with per-
fect monitoring are robust to private monitoring imperfections. That is, for
which (if any) equilibria is there guaranteed to be a nearby equilibrium when
monitoring is nearly perfect, but private. In this paper, we focus on the
repeated prisoners' dilemma and prove a robust folk theorem: for suciently
patient players, every feasible, individually rational payo can be achieved
by equilibrium strategies that are robust to private monitoring. This implies
a limit folk-theorem: For monitoring technologies suciently accurate and
discount factors close enough to one, any individually rational payo can be
2Bhaskar (1998) derives an even stronger necessary condition from a model in which
each player's payos are randomly perturbed in each period independently of history and
are private information to that player. In a repeated game with overlapping generations
of players (hence private monitoring), his condition implies that any equilibrium must be
a repetition of stage-game Nash outcomes.
3achieved in a sequential equilibrium of the private monitoring game.
Related results have been obtained elsewhere. Sekiguchi (1997) was the
rst to show that the mutual cooperation payo can be achieved in a class of
prisoners' dilemma games when monitoring is nearly perfect.3 Mailath and
Morris (1998) show that some trigger strategies are robust to monitoring
imperfections that are approximately \public." Monitoring is approximately
public when a players realized signal is informative of the signals observed
by others (even after conditioning on the realized action.) Conditional inde-
pendence is therefore ruled out.
To prove that trigger-strategy and other strict equilibria are robust, the
problem of discontinuous conditional beliefs must be circumvented. Condi-
tional beliefs about opponents' continuation strategies after histories involv-
ing a deviation change discontinuously when slight monitoring imperfections
are introduced. This can be seen in the above discussion of the Fudenberg
and Maskin (1991) strategies. When monitoring is perfect, when player i ob-
serves a deviation in stage 1, he is certain that his opponents will move into
the punishment phase. But when monitoring is conditionally independent,
following the corresponding (private) history player i is nearly certain that
his opponents will continue to cooperate. This observation, together with
the Matsushima result, make it clear that strict equilibria cannot be robust
to all private monitoring imperfections.
Mailath and Morris (1998) restrict attention to monitoring technologies in
which there is sucient correlation in the players' private signals, i.e. nearly
public monitoring. When monitoring is approximately public, player i will
be nearly certain that the opponents have also observed a deviation and will
begin punishing, even though it is common knowledge among the players
that no deviation has occured. Notice that conditional beliefs are no longer
discontinuous once the monitoring imperfections are restricted in this way.4
Our approach to the folk theorem deals with discontinuous conditional
beliefs in a simpler way. We construct stationary strategies which have the
property that each player is indierent among each of his actions no mat-
ter what private history his opponnent has observed. It is then irrelevant
3Bhaskar (1999) sharpens the analysis and shows that the payo restriction used in
Sekiguchi (1997) is not necessary. When public correlation devices are available, these
strategies can also be used to prove the folk theorem.
4There is still an additional complication to overcome in establishing that a strict
equilibrium is robust to approximate public monitoring. Conditional beliefs must move
continuously uniformly across the innite set of histories.
4how conditional beliefs are altered by the monitoring imperfections since the
players' continuation strategies will be a best-reply to every conditional be-
lief. This in turn implies that our strategies will be robust to all monitoring
imperfections, including conditional independence and even negative corre-
lation. We show that a large set of payos, including mutual cooperation,
can be supported by such equilibria. However, not all individually rational
payos can be supported in this way. To obtain the full folk theorem set
of payos, we show how these robust equilibria generate continuation val-
ues that can enforce behavior yielding payos outside the original set for a
suciently long but nite length of time.
A recent paper by Piccione (1998) employs a technique similar to ours. In
the repeated prisoners' dilemma Piccione uses dynamic programming tech-
niques over the innite state-space of private histories to construct the mixed
strategies necessary to maintain indierence. His strategies can be used to
approximate most of the feasible, individually rational payo set. Our ap-
proach uses stationary behavior strategies that condition only on one period
of history. This dramatically simplies the dynamic program yielding a sys-
tem of four equations which can easily be solved for equilibrium mixtures.5
Beyond the computational simplicity, the simple structure makes this a more
promising direction for results in more general games. We demonstrate the
ﬂexibility of our approach by analyzing some more general games in section
4.
In section 1, the perfect monitoring folk theorem is proven for a large
subset of the feasible payo set using simple two state mixed strategies. In
section 2, it is shown that the strategies used are robust, and the limit folk
theorem is established for these payos. In section 3 we show how to augment
these strategies to obtain the full set of feasible individually rational payos.
In section 4, we consider more general games. For 2 player games, we provide
a sucient condition on stage payos under which our approach will apply.
We also analyze a symmetric N-player prisoners' dilemma and show how to
extend our approach and obtain nearly cooperative payos for high discount
factors and suciently accurate monitoring. Finally, section 5 concludes.
5We also obtain the full set of payos exactly.
51 Perfect Monitoring
We consider the -discounted innitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, the nor-




Figure 1: Normalized Prisoners' Dilemma
In this section, monitoring is assumed perfect.6 Consider the family of
behavior strategies dened as follows. Player i's (i =1 ;2) plays C in stage
1, and in any subsequent stage t , his mixed action depends only on the
outcome in stage t − 1. Denote by i
aiaj the probability with which player i
plays C conditional on the outcome (ai;a j) occurring in the previous period.
Note that the behavior in period t>1 is independent of t. For consistency
with the following section, we will use lower-case subscripts, e.g. 
j
cd.B e l o w













Figure 2: Machine representation of i. To avoid clutter, we have left out
the arrows that return to the preceding state.
6Another interesting question concerns the robustness of the folk theorem under im-
perfect public monitoring: what payos in the public monitoring game can be obtained
when monitoring becomes nearly public, but remains imperfect? The techniques here can
be extended to this context, and is a subject for further research.
7Obara (1999a) independently applied strategies of this form to repeated games with
public monitoring.
6We will show that for any payo pair (v1;v 2) in the square V =( 0 ;1] 
(0;1], there are strategies of this form that constitute an equilibrium of
the repeated game (assuming sucient patience) and obtain average pay-
os (v1;v 2). In the next section, we will show that equilibria of this form
are robust to private monitoring. Obviously V is not the entire feasible,
individually-rational set. The construction will make it clear that more can-
not be achieved using strategies of this simple form. In section 3 we show
how to modify these strategies to obtain any feasible individually rational
payo in a robust equilibrium. Let V  denote the interior of V .
Fix values V i
C and V i
D in (0;1], with V i
C >Vi
D for i =1 ;2, and let  <1
satisfy minifV i
C − V i
Dg > 1 −  . The goal is to nd  2 ( ;1) suciently
large and to construct probabilities j such that (1) in any period in which
j is playing C,p l a y e ri is indierent between actions C and D and obtains
continuation value V i
C and (2), in any period in which player j is playing D,
player i is indierent between actions C and D and obtains continuation value
V i
D. From this it will follow that each player is indierent between C and D
after every history (a fact that is essential for the robustness argument), and
player i gets average payo V i































































C − (1 − ) − V i
D
(V i
C − V i
D)
Because V i
C − V i
D >Vi
C − V i
D > 1−  >1−, the numerator and hence the
fraction is greater than zero. It is no greater than one i V i
C −(1−)  V i
C
which is equivalent to V i
C  1 which was assumed. For future reference, note
that j
cc c a nb em a d ei n t e r i o ri fV i
C < 1.
















C − V i
D > 0, this is greater than zero and can be made arbitrarily
small by choosing  suciently close to 1. Thus, 
j
cd 2 (0;1) for suciently
large . Note also that for any such ,t h i s
j
cd 2 (0;1) continues to hold for
any ^ V i
C >Vi
C.
We have shown that then there exist probabilities j
cc 2 (0;1] and 
j
cd 2
(0;1) such that if V i
D is the value to player i when his opponent is playing D,
then V i
C is the value to i when his opponent is playing C,a n di is indierent
between C and D after such histories.











C − V i
D

This is always positive and will be less than 1 once  is suciently close to












C − V i
D

which again makes 
j
dc an interior probability once  is suciently large.
Again, if we x such , 
j
dc will remain interior for any V i
C closer to 1. Thus,
interior probabilities can be found to ensure that when player j is playing D,
player i is indierent between C and D and obtains a continuation value V i
D.
We conclude that for  suciently close to 1, there exists a strategy for
player j satisfying equations 1-4 for any value ^ V i
C 2 [V i
C;1]: By the symmetric
argument, there exists a strategy for player i which satisfy the analogous
equations for player j. Furthermore, since these equations imply that each
player is indierent between C and D after every history, each strategy is a
best-response to the other after every history. Thus, the strategies form a
subgame-perfect equilibrium of the perfect monitoring game and since each
strategy is assumed to play C in the rst stage, player i obtains average
payo vi = V i
C.
2 A Limit Folk Theorem
The focus now turns to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private moni-
toring. In this setting, players do not directly observe the actions chosen by
their opponent. Following each stage of play, each player observes his own
8chosen action and a private signal which depends on the outcome in that
stage. Let i be a nite set of signals for player i,a n d=ii. Assume
that each i has at least two elements.
A monitoring technology is a collection fm(ja):a 2f C;Dg2g of prob-
ability distributions over signal proles, one for each possible stage-game
outcome. The marginal distribution over player i's signal will be denoted
mi(ja). Perfect monitoring corresponds to a technology m0 which satises
two conditions. First, each m0(ja) exhibits perfect correlation (public moni-
toring); and second, for each i there is a set ci  i such that if aj = C then
mi
0(cija)=1a n di faj = D then mi
0(cija)=0 .
Say that a monitoring technology is an "-perturbation of m0 if for each i
there is a set ci  i such that aj = C implies mi(cija) > 1 − " and aj = D
implies mi(cija) <" . Note that this denition involves no requirement on
the correlation in m, and in particular, includes as a special case, indepen-
dent private monitoring: technologies m for which mi(ja) is independent
of mj(ja) for each a. Henceforth, we restrict attention to technologies that
are perturbations of m0 and write mi
aiaj = mi(cijai;a j), so for example mi
DC
represents the probability that i observes a signal in ci when i plays D and
j plays C.L e tdi denote the complement in i of ci.
The -discounted repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring
technology m will be denoted G1(;m). A strategy i in G1(;m) species
a mixed action for each history of own-actions and observed signals. We will
restrict attention to strategies which depend only on histories of length 1
and condition only on the player's own action and the events ci and di.B y
analogy to the previous section, write e.g. i
dc for the probability with which
player i plays C following a stage in which i played D and observed a signal
in ci.S e ti
; =1 .
For any two strategy proles ;~  of this form, dene the distance j− ~ j
to be maxji
s − ~ i
sj where the maximum is over players i =1 ;2a n ds t a t e ss
of the machine.
Denition 1 A subgame-perfect equilibrium  of G1(;m0) is robust to
private monitoring if for every e>0 there exists  ">0 such that for all
" 2 (0;  ") and all "-perturbations m" of m0, there is a sequential equilibrium ~ 
of G1(;m"),w i t h i ne distance of  and with payos within e of the payos
under .
A sucient condition for a pair (1;2) to be a sequential equilibrium
9of G1(;m)w i t hp a y o  s( v1;v 2) is for the mixtures to solve the following
equations for V i
C = vi, i =1 ;2, j 6= i.
V
i






















































































































Equations 5 and 6 state that player i gets average payo V i
C when he
plays either C or D in any stage in which player j plays C. Equations 5 and
6 state that player i gets average payo V i
D when he plays either C or D in
any stage in which player j plays D. If these equations are satised, then
player i is always indierent between his two actions and is therefore willing
to play any mixed strategy after every history.




;C = 0 and these equations
reduce to equations 1-4 from the previous section. There it was shown that
provided  is suciently large and V i
C 2 (0;1], a solution ( j;  V i
C;  V i
D) exists ,
and that the mixtures  
j
cd and  
j
dc can be chosen to be interior. We can now
x  j
cc and  
j
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CD .T h e s e
equations dene the left-hand side variables as continuous functions of the
10monitoring parameters. Since  
j
cd and  
j





;C suciently close to zero, there exists a solution (j;Vi
D;Vi
C)
to equations 5-8 with mixtures j and values V i
C;Vi
D arbitrarily close to
( j;  V i
C;  V i
D). Player j therefore has a strategy against which every strat-
egy of player i is a best-response and achieves payo V i
C. This establishes
the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Robust folk theorem) Let (v1;v 2) 2 V . There exist   2
(0;1) such that for all  2 ( ;1), there exists a robust subgame perfect equi-
librium of G1(;m0) with payos (v1;v 2).
Now suppose V i
C 2 (0;1) and recall that this implies that  j
cc 2 (0;1). We
can now x ( V i
C;  V i
D) 2 (0;1)2 and solve equations 5-8 for the following explicit



































































































C − V i
D)
One can easily verify that these dene equilibrium behavior strategies as
continuous functions of the monitoring probabilities mj. Since all mixtures
in j are interior, it follows that for m
j
;D and 1 − m
j
;C suciently close to
zero, equations 5-8 can be solved for probabilities j, and the symmetric set
of equations can be solved for probabilities i. These solutions will be Nash
equilibria of the private monitoring game with values ( V 1
C;  V 2
C). This proves
the limit folk theorem
Theorem 2 (Limit folk theorem) Let (v1;v 2) 2 V . There exist  ; " 2
(0;1) such that for all  2 ( ;1) and " 2 (0;  "),i fm is an "-perturbation
of m0, then there exists a sequential equilibrium of G1(;m) with payos
(v1;v 2).
11The order of quantication was not proven above. In the previous section,
it was shown that if there is a solution for some  then there is a solution
for any larger ^ . One can easily verify that the same holds here: if there
are probabilities that solve equations 5-8 for some " and , then there are
probabilities that solve the equations for " and any ^ > .
3 Extending to the Full Payo Set
We have shown that any payo pair in V can be obtained in a robust equi-
librium. This leaves out much of the feasible, individually rational set of
payos. In particular, the only ecient payo pair in V is the symmetric
payo (1;1). Unfortunately, nothing outside of V can be obtained robustly
using strategies of the simple form considered above. To see this, note that
if in equilibrium, player i is indierent between C and D after every history,
then his long-run average payo must be equal to the payo he would get by
playing C after every history. Obviously such a payo cannot exceed 1.
However, more can be achieved using more complicated (yet still nite-
state) strategies. We sketch the idea here, and prove it formally below.
Return to the perfect monitoring case. Fix V 1
D > 0c l o s et oz e r oa n dV 2
C =1
Let V 1
C be any value in (V 1
D;1]. We have shown in theorem 1 that for  close
enough to 1, there exist robust equilibrium strategies (1;2)w h i c ho b t a i n
values (V 1
C;V2
C), and player 2's strategy can be chosen so that player 1 obtains
value V 1
D whenever player 2 plays D.
Consider the following strategies. Player 1 plays C in stage 1, then pro-
ceeds with 1 starting in stage 2. Player 2 plays D in stage 1. In stage 2,
player 2 switches to strategy 2 but starts in state D if he observes that
player 1 has played D in stage 1. If 2 observes that 1 has played C, 2 starts
in state C.
Let (v1;v 2)=( 1− )(−l;1+g)+(V 1
C;V2
C). The above strategies form
an equilibrium with payos (v1;v 2) if the following incentive constraints are
satised.
(1 − )(1 + g)+V
1








These hold for suciently large . Note that the payos (v1;v 2) are outside
of V . Now we claim that this equilibrium is robust to private monitoring.
To see this, note that in stage two, each player is indierent between his
12two actions regardless of the outcome in stage 1. Each is therefore willing
to behave as the strategy demands even after erroneous signals. The con-
tinuation payos V 1
C;V2
C;V1
D are continuous in the monitoring perturbation
because the continuation strategies are robust. Thus, because the rst-stage
incentive constraints are satised with strict inequalities, they will continue
to hold for small perturbations of m0. We show below that by increasing the
number of stages in which (C;D) is played, any feasible individually rational
payo vector can be sustained in a robust equilibrium.
To prove this formally, we make an additional assumption. We assume
that g − l  1 so that mutual cooperation is not Pareto-dominated by any
other prole. We make this assumption merely to simplify the exposition
as this allows us to achieve any individually rational payo by a convex
combination of the set V and a single additional point. Our result continues
to hold without this assumption, with strategies alternating between (C;D)
and (D;C), slightly complicating the proof.
For P  Rn, denote by Co(P), the convex hull of P.
Lemma 1 Let P be a convex subset of Rn with a non-empty interior amd
v 2 Rn: For any u 2 int co(P [f vg); t h e r ei sa such that for all  2 (;1];







Proof: Fix u 2 int co(P [fvg): Since P is convex with a non-empty interior,
there is a 0 2 (0;1) and a w0 2 int P such that




Since w0 2 int P; there is (by continuity) an ">0( a n d"< 0); such that
for all  2 B" (0); there is a w() 2 P satisfying
u =( 1− )v + w():
Let N ()=m a x fn j n  0g: The remaining task is hence to show that
there is a  such that for all  2 (;1]; N() 2 B" (0): By construction,
N()+1 < 0 and hence N() < 0
 or N() −0 < 0





claim holds for  =
0−"
0 .
Theorem 3 For each v 2 V  t h e r ei sa  2 (0;1) such that for all  2 ( ;1)
there is a robust subgame perfect equilibrium of G1(;m0) with payos v.
13Proof:
Let V 
1 be the subset of V  in which player 1's payo is at least 1 (and
hence player 2's payo is less than 1). We will show that each v 2 V 
1
is a robust equilibrium payo for  close enough to 1. Together with the
symmetric argument when the players roles are reversed, this will establish
the theorem.
If v 2 V 
1 then v 2 Co(V [f (1 + g;−l)g) (see gure 3). By lemma 1
there is a   such that for all  2 ( ;1) there is a N and u 2 V such that
v =( 1− N)(1 + g;−l)+Nu.N o t e t h a t s i n c e u2 > 0 > −l, u2 >v 2.
Choose w2 so that 0 <w 2 <v 2 and  suciently close to 1 so that u and




















Figure 3: Prisoner's Dilemma feasiblepayo set.
Consider the following strategy prole. Player 1 plays D indpendent of
history for the rst N periods. If player 1 observes that 2 has played C
in each of the rst N stages, player 1 continues with a strategy s1 against
which every strategy of player 2 is a best-response and achieves a payo of
u2. Otherwise, player 1 continues in stage N + 1 with a strategy s0
1 against
which every strategy of player 2 achieves a payo of w2. 8
Player 2 plays C in each of the rst N stages provided he has never played
D. If in any of the rst N −1 stages, 2 has played D, then 2 continues with
D through stage N. Independent of history, beginning in stage N +1 ,2
8In a working paper version, we showed by a more complicated argument that less
draconian strategies can be used.
14plays a strategy s2 against which every strategy of player 1 achieves a payo
of u1.
By construction, any continutation for player 1 is a best response to s2
beginning in stage N + 1. And since 2 continues with s2 is independent of
history, it is a best-response for 1 to play D in each of the rst N stages.
Likewise, s2 is a best response to both s1 and s0
1 beginning in stage N +1.
To establish that this prole is a subgame perfect equilibrium, therefore, it
remains only to check that 2 is willing to play according to the equilibrium
in each of the rst N stages. If 2 has played D prior to stage N,t h e n
independent of any future history, 1 will play s0
1 and 2 will receive contin-
uation payo w2. Therefore, 2 optimally continues with D through stage
N. Finally, suppose that in each stage up to s  N,2h a sp l a y e dC.I f 2
plays according to the equilibrium, his payo is −l(1−N−s+1)+N−s+1u2 >
−l(1−N)+Nu2 = v2. If he instead plays D in stage s a n dt h e nc o n t i n u e s
with his equilibrium strategy, his payo is N−s+1w2 <w 2.S i n c e w2 <v 2,
player 2 optimally plays C.
To conclude the proof, we show that the above equilibrium is robust. By
Theorem 1, for any suciently small "-perturbation of m0, there are contin-
uation strategies ~ s1;~ s0
1,a n d~ s2 arbitrarily close to s1;s 0
1,a n ds2, generating
continuation payos arbitrarily close to w1;u 1; and u2 respectively, and mak-
ing the opponent indierent among all strategies. It follows that beginning
in stage N +1 ,b o t h~ s1 and and ~ s0
1 are best-responses to ~ s2 and ~ s2 is a
best-response for 2 whatever his belief over s1 and s0
1. The players will play
as before for the rst N stages, and now continue with these continuation
strategies. The payos in the rst N stages are unaected by ". The distri-
bution over N-stage histories, and hence continuation payos beginning in
stage N +1 is continuous in ". Therefore " can be taken suciently small so
that the overall payos to these strategies are arbitrarily close to v and they
remain a sequential equilibrium.
4 Extensions
In this section, we outline brieﬂy how the method for nding robust subgame
perfect equilibria can be extended to more general games.
154.1 Two-Player Games
Let G =( A1;A 2;g 1;g 2) be a nite two- player normal form game, where Ai
are the action sets and gi payo functions. Let G1 () the innitely repeated
game with G as the stage game and  as the discount factor. Consider two
strategy proles (a0
1;a 0
2)a n d( a00
1;a 00
2) and assume that the following condition






























The rst step is again the construction of a subgame perfect equilibrium in
the game with perfect monitoring where the players mix between (a0
i;a 00
i). In
analogy to the previous sections, let i
ai;aj 2 (Ai) be the probability distri-
bution on player i0s pure actions conditional on observing outcome (ai;a j)a t
the previous stage, and let V i
ai be as before.
Theorem 4 For any v 2 (v1; v1)  (v2; v2), there is a <1 such that v can
be supported as SPE payo in G1 () for all > using strategies where
i
ai;aj (a0
i) > 0; i
ai;aj (a00
i) > 0 and i
ai;aj (ai)=0for ai = 2f a0
i;a 00
ig:
Proof: Pick V i
a0
j and V i
a00




j <  vi: Suppose that
j randomizes between a00
j and a0
j in each period so that j





































































































































































































































































































The rst set of equalities and inequalities can, in fact, be solved as a set
















































< 1 whenever  is
suciently close to 1.














































































are probabilities for  suciently close to 1.
The second set cannot be satised as equalities, in general. To see this






































j; the solution is negative.
This does not cause any problems, however, since we can pick an arbitrary
 V i with V i
a00
j <  V i <V i
a0


















































17A similar set of conditions holds for player j, and given that each player
is indierent after each history between actions a0
i and a00
i; and given that all
other actions yield a weakly lower payo, the randomizations above are best
responses.
An argument similar to that in the previous sections can be given to show
that there is, in fact, a robust subgame perfect equilibrium that yields v as
the payo vector. Two corollaries follow immediately from the result above.
Let e =( e1;e 2) be a pure strategy Nash equilibrium prole of the stage game.
Denote the stage game equilibrium payos by ve
1 and ve
2 respectively.
Corollary 1 If there is a prole a =( a1;a 2) such that minfgi (ei;a −i);g i (ei;e −i)g >
ve
i for i 2f 1;2g; then the set of robust subgame perfect equilibrium payos
has a non empty interior. Furthermore, we can require that player i uses at
each stage either ai or ei for i =1 ;2:
As an example of this corollary, consider the discretized Cournot compe-
tition model with linear demands. For concreteness, let Ai = f0;1;2;:::;20g
and gi (ai;a j)=ai (20 − ai − aj): A Nash equilibrium of the stage game is
ei = ej =7 : The monopoly price is supported by action prole a1 = a2 =5 :
Observe that gi (e)=4 2,gi (a) = 50 and gi (ai;e j)=5 6 : As a result, we
conclude that any v 2 (42;50)
2 can be supported as a robust subgame perfect
equilibrium for suciently high :
For the second corollary, let mi 2 Ai be the action that minmaxes player
j: Let vi denote the pure strategy minmax payo of each player.
Corollary 2 If there is an (a1;a 2) such that minfgi (mi;a −i);g i (ai;a −i)g >
vi for i 2f 1;2g; then the set of robust subgame perfect equilibrium payos
has a non empty interior. Furthermore, we can require that player i uses at
each stage either ai or mi:
Using this corollary, it is easy to see that in some games, payos below
those resulting from the unique dominant strategy equilibrium of the stage
game are sustainable in robust subgame perfect equilibrium and hence in
games with small imperfections in the monitoring technologies. Consider
e.g. gure 4.
In this example, mi = a2 for i =1 ;2: Hence the Corollary above im-
plies that any v 2 (−1;0)
2 can be supported as a robust equilibrium payo.
Observe also that the pure strategy Nash equilibrium payo cannot be ap-
proximated by a mixed strategy equilibrium of the type as described above.9




Figure 4: Payos below the dominant strategy equilibrium can be supported.
4.2 N-Player Case
We conclude this section by analyzing an example of a symmetric N -player
game. The basic diculty in comparison to the two player case is that the
transitions between the states of the machines equivalent to those described
in the previous section are no longer linear in the randomizations of the other
players (even after conditioning on own actions). As a result, the probabilities
cannot be solved for as before by simple linear algebra. In this subsection,
we show that for  close to unity, we can recover approximate linearity and
show the robustness by an application of the implicit function theorem.10
We consider here the following version of the N -player Prisoner's Dilemma.
Ai = fC;Dg for i =1 ;:::;N; and gi (C;a−i)=ni (a−i)=gi (D;a−i)+1; where
ni (a−i) is the number of players dierent from i that play C in prole a−i:
Let G1() stand for the innitely repeated version of this game with discount
factor :
Suppose that all players are using strategies of the following form:

i
ai;ni =P rfC j ag:
In words, each player bases her own randomizations solely on her own past
actions and the number of other players that cooperated, not their iden-
tity. The next theorem shows that outcomes arbitrarily close to the ecient
outcome can be supported
Theorem 5 For any v 2 (0;N) t h e r ei sa such that for all >; G1 ()
has a completely mixed SPE in which each player obtains a payo of v.
Proof: Construct the following sequence of numbers:
V (0) = v0;V(n)=v0 +
n
(N − 1)
(v − v0) for n 2f 1;:::;N − 1g: (12)
many periods before reverting to an equilibrium in the set (−1;0)2. These strategeis are
robust by the argument made in section 3
10Obara (1999b) also analyzes the N-player prisoner's dilemma. He uses an extension of
the Sekiguchi (1997) approach to obtain an approximately ecient symmetric equilibrium.
19We show that each V (n) can be interpreted as the value to a player in the
game when n other players cooperate at the current stage.
To simplify notation, write the strategies as:
C;n =1− γn and D;n = n:
Note that we have dropped the superscript as we will now restrict attention
to symmetric strategies. We are interested in the existence of equilibria
in strategies of this type for  large enough. The dynamic programming
equations become then for n 2f 0;:::;N − 1g:
V (n)=( 1 − )n + ED;nV (n
0); (13)
V (n)=( 1 − )(n − 1) + EC;nV (n
0);
where EC;nV (n0) denotes the expected value from tomorrow on conditional
on the action prole today The transition probabilities are nonlinear in
(γn; n) since they are obtained from two binomial distributions.
Suppose that the strategies used by the players depend on  as follows:
γn () j=1=0 ; n () j=1= 0 for all n 2f 0;:::;N − 1g:
In this case, the equations in (13) are trivially satised at  =1 ,a n d
in particular, the sequence given in 12 solves the system. Write γ()=
(γ0();:::;γ N−1()) and ()=( 0();:::; N−1()). We want to use the
implicit function theorem to conclude that the nonlinear system, 13 has a so-
lution (γ();()) for  in a neighborhood of 1. Next, to guarantee that the
solutions are indeed probabilities, we need to show that for all n;
@γn
@ (1) > 0
and
@n
@ (1) > 0
To apply the implicit function theorem, we treat (13) as a system of 2N
equations that implicitly dene the 2N probabilities (γ();()). Write this
system as
V (γ;;)=0 ;
with γ; as the endogenous variables and  as the exogenous variable.
Viewing (13) as a system of N − 1 pairs of equations, denote by VnD
the rst function of the nth pair and VnC the second. We now evaluate the
partial derivatives of the system at the original solution (for  =1 )w i t h












=( N − n − 1)(V (n +1 )− V (n))
It can easily be veried that this system has full rank. The implicit function
theorem then guarantees the existence of a dierentiable solution mapping
(γ();() in the neighborhood of  = 1. To check the sign of the derivatives,













V (0) − 1
V (1) − 1
V (1) − 2
. . .
V (N − 1) − (N − 1)











Observe that the system of equations,
D
￿;
￿V (γ;;)D(γ();()) = −DV (γ;;)
can be solved in blocks of size 2. This makes the comparative statics relatively
easy:
 
n(V (n − 1) − V (n)) (N − n − 1)(V (n +1 )− V (n))









V (n) − n +1
V (n +1 )− n − 1
!
:
Using the fact that V (n +1 )− V (n)=V (k) − V (k − 1) for all k;n 2
f0;1;:::;N − 1g; it is easy to see that the derivatives have the right sign
whenever v0 is chosen close enough to v: Hence for  close enough to one, the
system can be solved for probabilities. This implies that for such discount
factors, the game has a completely mixed SPE with a payo v.
21In order to obtain the result on games with almost perfect monitoring,
x a  for which there is a completely mixed SPE with payo vector v:
We can make the same continuity argument as in the previous section to
conclude that whenever the monitoring is close enough to perfect, a sequential
equilibrium with payo vector v exists.
5 Conclusion
There are many unresolved questions in the context of discounted repeated
games with private monitoring. In particular, unlike the public monitoring
case, there is no known folk theorem for xed monitoring technologies.11
In this note, we have followed the literature and sought after the weaker
result: a limit folk theorem for nearly perfect monitoring. An important goal
for future research is to characterize equilibrium payos when monitoring is
private but far from perfect. The strategies we have used in this paper can
sustain some cooperation under less than perfect monitoring technologies
and equilibrium can be characterized by an analogous system of dynamic
programming equations. The payos that can be supported are thus those
values for which the system can be solved for probabilities. Determining the
full potential of this approach is ongoing research.
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